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JUDGMENTS: FRAUD AS A BASIS FOR RELIEF IN FEDERAL
COURTS FROM FINAL STATE COURT JUDGMENTS
FINAL JUDGMENTS frequently are not accorded the finality the term
suggests, and their binding effect may be eviscerated in a number of
ways.' In appropriate circumstances these judgments may be nulli-
fied either directly or collaterally, and occasionally may be attacked
via a hybrid proceeding.2 The following discussion assumes that a
final state court judgment, valid on its face, is attacked in a federal
court on the ground of fraud.3 The purpose of this comment is to
identify the fraudulent conduct for which a federal court will grant
relief from a final state court judgment and to ascertain the scope of
the relief which may be granted.
THE EXTIUNSIC-INTuNsIc DISTINCTION
It has generally been recognized that relief from a prior judg-
ment will not be granted as a matter of course upon a mere showing
IThe binding effect of judgments may be avoided by: a new trial; altering, amend-
ing or vacating the judgment; moving for judgment notwithstanding the verdict;
appeal; setting aside for mistake, inadvertance, surprise, excusable neglect, newly
discovered evidence, or fraud; or enjoining enforcement. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); 3
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1178 (5th ed. 1925).
"'A direct attack on a judgment is an attempt to avoid or correct it in some
manner provided by law, in a proceeding instituted for that very purpose .... [I]f
the action or proceeding has an independent purpose and contemplates some other
relief or result, although the overturning of the judgment may be important or even
necessary to its success, then the attack on the judgment is collateral." 49 C.J.S.
Judgments § 408 (1947).
One commentator has asserted that an independent action in equity to enjoin the
enforcement of a valid judgment is not exactly a collateral or a direct attack, but
might be termed an indirect attack because "the action recognizes that the judgment
is valid, but seeks to establish certain conduct or matter that renders the enforcement
of the valid judgment inequitable." 7 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.25[2] & n.16 (2d
ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as MooRE].
8 Such assumptions ignore the difficult problems which are encountered in proceed-
ings attacking prior judgments which arise from the determination of whether the
prior judgment is or is not final; the record is complete and/or correct on its face; the
tribunal was competent to hear the issue presented; the court had jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter; the court was competent to render the judgment
given; and the citizenship of the parties and the amount in controversy is appropriate
to establish federal jurisdiction.
For an analysis of some of the current problems and well-reasoned suggestions for
improvements in the law regarding attacks on final judgments see Comment, 66 YAMn
L.J. 526, 541-42 (1957).
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of the existence of fraud.4 This reluctance apparently is an out-
growth of the doctrine of res judicata,5 which precludes repeated
litigation on the same issue by the same parties. In United States v.
ThrockmortonO the Supreme Court laid down the general rule for
granting relief from prior final judgments on the ground of fraud.
The Court there was concerned with an attempt to avoid the effect
of a final judgment on the ground that the judgment had been based
in part on a forged document which had been admitted as evidence.
In denying relief, the Court acknowledged that extrinsic or collateral
fraud which prevented a losing party from fully presenting his case
so that no real contest occurred would be sufficient to set aside a
prior judgment, but held that fraud as to any matter which was
actually presented and considered in the judgment assailed would be
insufficient to support the attacking action. 7
The fundamental basis for the Court's distinction appears to be
in accord with the principle that a final judgment concludes all
matters actually presented or necessarily considered in reaching the
decision.8 Thus the Throckmorton case established an extrinsic-
intrinsic dichotomy which allowed relief from a fraudulently ob-
tained judgment only in situations where the doctrine of res judicata
'E.g., 7 MOORE 60.37[1] nn.38 8- 39.
r For a comprehensive discussion of the doctrine of res judicata, see 2 FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS ch. XI (5th ed. 1925), wherein the author states: "When a matter is once
adjudicated, it is conclusively determined as between the same parties and their privies;
and this determination is binding as an estoppel, in all other actions, whether com-
menced before or after the action in which the adjudication was made." Id. § 670 at
1413-14.
0 98 U.S. 61 (1878).
7"But there is an admitted exception to this general rule [that an issue once
litigated to a final judgment will bar subsequent litigation on the same issue] in cases
where, by reason of something done by the successful party to a suit, there was in
fact no adversary trial or decision of the issue in the case. Where the unsuccessful
party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception
practised on him by his opponent . . . which show that there has never been a real
contest in the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be
sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case
for a new and fair hearing. .-. . On the other hand, the doctrine is equally well
settled that the court will not set aside a judgment because it was founded on a
fraudulent instrument, or perjured evidence, or for any matter which was actually
presented and considered in the judgment assailed. . . . T]he acts for which a court
of equity will on account of fraud set aside or annul a judgment or decree, between
the same parties, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, have relation to frauds,
extrinsic or collateral, to the matter tried by the first court, and not to a fraud in the
matter on which the decree was rendered." Id. at 65-66, 68. (Emphasis added.)8 See note 5 supra.
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would not be violated. This concept has been expressly adopted in
twenty-nine jurisdictions. 9
In the subsequent case of Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale
Co.,10 the Supreme Court failed to follow the extrinsic-intrinsic
dichotomy established in Throckmorton and added a duplicitous
category. In denying an injunction against enforcement of a prior
judgment on asserted fraudulent grounds, the Court stated that an
application of the extrinsic-intrinsic distinction was superfluous un-
less it was first found that the fraud charged prevented the com-
plaining party from making a full and fair defense.1" Professor
Moore, relying on a phalanx of authority, states that fraudulent
conduct which prevents a party from fairly and fully presenting his
claims or defenses is extrinsic fraud.12 It therefore appears that the
Court in Toledo Scale Co., despite its refusal to apply the extrinsic
or intrinsic labels, was actually following the Throckmorton distinc-
tion by predicating relief on a finding that the fraud charged pre-
vented the presentation of a valid defense.
It has also been asserted that a position contrary to that of the
Court in the Throckmorton case was taken when a similar question
arose in Marshall v. Holmes.'3 Referring to these two cases, one
writer has stated:
The Supreme Court of the United States, to show its utter impar-
tiality, has ruled both ways, and left the spectacle of two cases, one of
which holds that false evidence is a ground for reversal, the other that it
is not, both of which have been followed, and neither of which has ever
been overruled.' 4
0 Ariz., Ark., Cal., Ga., Idaho, Iowa, Ind., Kan., Ky., La., Md., Mich., Minn., Miss.,
Mo., Nev., NJ., N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, OkIa., Pa., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah,
and Wash. See authorities cited note 4 supra; 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 269 n.3 (1947);
7 MooRE 60.37[l] nn.38 & 39.
10261 U.S. 399 (1923).
11 
"We do not find ourselves obliged to enter upon a consideration of the some-
times nice distinctions made between intrinsic and extrinsic frauds in the application
of the rule, because in any case to justify setting aside a decree for fraud whether
extrinsic or intrinsic, it must appear that the fraud charged really prevented the
party complaining from making a full and fair defense. If it does not so appear, then
proof of the ultimate fact, to wit, that the decree was obtained by fraud, fails."
Id. at 421.
12 "Fraud is extrinsic where a party is prevented by trick, artifice or other fraudu-
lent conduct from fairly presenting his claim or defenses or introducing relevant and
material evidence." 7 MooRE 60.37[l] & n.17.
12 141 U.S. 589 (1891).
14 Note, Fraud as a Basis for Setting Aside a Judgment, 21 COLUm. L. REv. 268,
269 (1921).
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The distinction made in the above quotation occasionally has
been accepted to mean that the Supreme Court has taken opposing
positions on the validity of the extrinsic-intrinsic dichotomy.'5 Such
an interpretation appears patently erroneous for two reasons. First,
assuming that these two decisions are incompatible, the conflict is
not in regard to the validity of the extrinsic-intrinsic distinction, but
to the application of the distinction to a particular set of facts:
whether forged evidence admitted in the prior action is extrinsic or
intrinsic fraud on the party against whom it was used."0 Secondly,
it is by no means clear that the Court in Marshall v. Holmes held
forged evidence to be extrinsic fraud. What the Court did hold was
that a state court could not properly deny removal of a proceeding
from a state court to a federal court if the general nature of the pro-
ceeding for which removal was sought was one of which the federal
courts could rightfully take cognizance. The Court regarded an
action to set aside a judgment in which the losing party had been
fraudulently prevented from asserting a valid defense as being in the
general nature of a proceeding of which a federal court could right-
fully take cognizance under its equity power. Without passing on
the merits of whether a forged instrument was or was not the type of
fraud for which relief would be granted, the Court held, that once
the general nature of the action was found to be within the cog-
nizance of the federal court, it was for the federal court, not the state
court, to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to relief.'7
As a result of these and other statements attributing opposing
positions to the Court in the Throckmorton and Marshall decisions
the validity of the extrinsic-intrinsic dichotomy is uncertain. 18 The
l See Note, Relief in Federal Courts Against State Judgments Obtained by Fraud,
54 YALE L.J. 687, 693 n.20 (1945), and authorities cited therein.
"' In the Throckmorton case the plaintiff sought to have a prior judgment set
aside on the ground that it had been obtained through the admission into evidence
of a forged deed; in Marshall v. Holmes the plaintiff sought to set aside the prior
judgment on the ground that a letter authorizing her agent to contract for her, on
which denial of recovery in the prior action was based, was a forgery.
17"The suit being, in its general nature, one of which the Circuit Court of the
United States could rightfully take cognizance, it was for that court, after the cause
was docketed there, and upon final hearing, to determine whether, under the
allegations and proof, a case was made which, according to the established principles
of equity, entitled [plaintiff] to protection against the judgments alleged to have been
fraudulently obtained." 141 U.S. at 601.
I "E.g., Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Callicotte, 267 Fed. 799 (8th Cir. 1920); Laun v.
Kipp, 155 Wis. 347, 145 N.W. 183 (1914); Boring v. Ott, 138 Wis. 260, 119 N.W.
865 (1909). See 3 BARRON & HoLrzoFF, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1331 (rev
ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as BARRON & HoLrzoFF]; 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1233 (5th
ed. 1925); Annot., 88 A.L.R. 1201 (1934).
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thrust of the decisions, however, appears to be aimed at creating a
distinction which does not prostitute the res judicata doctrine. It
may therefore be concluded, regardless of the application of the in-
trinsic label, that where the asserted fraud was considered or pre-
sented in the prior action, it will be an insufficient basis upon which
to grant relief from the prior judgment.
The converse, however, does not necessarily follow. The mere
fact that the issue of fraud presented in the attacking action was not,
and could not have been, litigated in the prior action does not con-
clusively establish a right to relief.19 As an independent action to
obtain relief from a prior judgment is limited to an equitable pro-
ceeding,20 relief will be granted only in accordance with general
equitable principles. Consequently, even in situations where the
doctrine of res judicata would not bar the subsequent judicial de-
termination of the issue of fraud, courts nevertheless have refused
relief under general equitable principles in cases where the dis-
closure of fraudulently concealed documents would not have changed
the result,21 where the fraud did not prevent the presentation of a
good defense,22 where the fraud would have been discovered but for
the negligence of the complaining party,23 where the fraud caused no
injury,24 or where the complaining party delayed an unreasonable
length of time after discovering, or after he should have discovered,
the fraud.25
THE ScoPE oF RELIEF
Requirement for Independent Proceeding
It is well settled that in appropriate cases the federal courts may
grant relief from prior judgments obtained by fraud.26 When the
judgment being attacked was rendered by a state court rather than
another federal court, relief may be had only in an independent
action which attacks the prior decree. This doctrine was clearly
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Barrow v. Hunton.27 In pass-
'o See note 72 infra.
20 See notes 33 & 34 infra.
21 Kithcart v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 119 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1941).
22 Crim v. Handley, 94 U.S. 652 (1876).
21 Sorenson v. Sutherland, 109 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1940).
" Annot., 113 A.L.R. 1235 (1938), and authorities cited therein.
" Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930).
"0 Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 332 (1813). See note 33 infra
and accompanying text.
27 99 U.S. 80 (1878).
Vol. 1964:109]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
ing on the legality of removing to a federal court an action which
attacked a prior state court judgment for fraud, Mr. Justice Bradley
stated that a United States court could not properly entertain juris-
diction of a proceeding so connected with the original suit as to form
an incident to it or a substantial continuation of it, but that an
original or independent proceeding to set aside a decree for fraud
might be within the cognizance of the federal court.28
Following this doctrine, the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have repeatedly and consistently held that the federal courts
cannot sit in review of state court judgments, but may prevent a
party from benefiting from his fraudulently obtained judgment only
in an independent equitable proceeding. 9 This limitation of seek-
ing relief via an independent action rather than an ancillary or sup-
plementary proceeding presumably would require the re-enactment
of all steps necessary to institute an original action. Process must
be served and jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter
must be re-established.30
The requirement for an independent proceeding may create addi-
tional complications when the attacking action is first brought in the
same tribunal, or a court of review of the same tribunal, which ren-
dered the judgment being attacked, and thereafter is attempted to
be removed to a federal court. A determination that the attacking
action which is sought to be removed was brought as an original or
independent action will be necessary to properly sustain the removal.
This frequently may be difficult because of the fact that the tribunal
from which removal is sought may be appropriate to hear either a
supplementary or an independent attack on the decree which is to be
vitiated.31
2 "If the proceeding is merely tantamount to the common-law practice of moving
to set aside a judgment for irregularity, or to a writ of error, or to a bill of review
or an appeal it would belong to [the category of a supplementary proceeding so
connected with the original suit as to form an incident to it, and substantially a
continuation of it], and the United States court could not properly entertain juris-
diction of the case. . . . On the other hand, if the proceedings are tantamount to
a bill in equity to set aside a decree for fraud in the obtaining thereof, then they
constitute an original and independent proceeding, and . . . the case might be within
the cognizance of the Federal courts." Id. at 82-83.
2"E.g., Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915); Howard v. DeCordova, 177
U.S. 609 (1900); Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10 (1875); Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v.
Connell, 252 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1958); and United States v. Mashunkshey, 72 F.2d
847 (10th Cir. 1934).
3'See generally 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, §§ 21-70.
"1 See generally 7 Moou. 60.39(l].
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Restriction to Equitable Relief
In 1813, the Supreme Court adopted the principle, derived from
an early anonymous English case, 2 that an independent action to
obtain relief from a prior judgment is an equitable proceeding.33
The consistent pronouncements of the federal courts since that time
have indicated that the principle of restricting the relief which a
federal court may grant from a final state court judgment to equita-
ble remedies and denying any action on the prior judgment directly
has been accepted without opposition.34
The requirements which should exist before a federal court will
exercise its equity power to prevent a successful party from utilizing
a prior final judgment were succinctly stated in National Surety Co.
v. State Bank:35
The indispensable elements of such a cause of action are (1) a judgment
which ought not, in good conscience, to be enforced; (2) a good defense
to the alleged cause of action on which the judgment is founded; (3)
fraud, accident or mistake which prevented the defendant in the judg-
ment from obtaining the benefit of his defense; (4) the absence of fault
or negligence on the part of the defendant; and (5) the absence of any
adequate remedy at law.36
This power of the federal courts appears to be expressly recog-
nized in rule 60 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states in part:
32 Anonymous, Litt. 37, 124 Eng. Rep. 124 (Ex. 1626). "If a judgment be given in
an action at common law, the Chancellor may not alter or meddle with the judgment,
but he may proceed against the person for corrupt conscience, because he takes
advantage of the law against conscience." Ibid. Translated and quoted in English in
7 MooRE 60.36, at 601.
"' Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 332 (1813). "Without attempting
to draw any precise line to which courts of equity will advance, and which they cannot
pass, in restraining parties from availing themselves of judgments obtained at law,
it may safely be said, that any fact which clearly proves it to be against conscience
to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party could not have availed him-
self in a court of law; or of which he might have availed himself at law, but was
prevented by fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or
his agents, will justify an application to a court of chancery.
"On the other hand, it may with equal safety be laid down as a general rule,
that a defence cannot be set up in equity, which has been fully and fairly tried at
law, although it may be the opinion of that court, that the defence ought to have
been sustained at law." Id. at 336.
" See, e.g., West Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber Co., 213 F.2d
702 (5th Cir. 1954); McSherry Mfg. Co. v. Dowagiac Mfg. Co., 160 Fed. 948 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 214 US. 512 (1908); Sayers v. Burkhardt, 85 Fed. 246 (4th Cir. 1898),
cert. denied, 172 U.S. 649 (1899).
"120 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903).
"Id. at 599.
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This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding .... 37
THE APPLICABLE LAW
The third significant consideration as to relief available in the
federal courts from a prior final state court judgment evolves
from the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 38 which directs that
matters of substance, which are distinguished from matters of pro-
cedure, be determined by state law rather than federal law in di-
versity cases. In many proceedings attacking final state court judg-
ments, the selection of the applicable law will be a moot problem
because of the substantially similar results that would be reached
under both sets of rules. However, the determination of the appli-
cable law will not always be merely a theoretical problem, 9 and in
such situations the resolution of this question may well determine
the right to relief. It therefore is essential to determine whether
federal law or state law is applicable to such attacks.
It has frequently been indicated that the right to attack a prior
state court judgment for fraud in an independent action is a sub-
stantive question,40 and therefore is controlled by state law. On the
other hand, it has been asserted4' that the Erie doctrine is not ap-
plicable in independent actions attacking prior final judgments, on
the ground that such attacks are matters of procedure. For example,
in Griffith v. Bank of New York, 42 in reversing the dismissal of an
independent attack on a prior New York state court judgment, 48
Judge Clark of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, without
citing any substantiating authority, stated:
But since the matters here involved are procedural, the doctrine of Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins [citations omitted] is not involved.44
87 FED. R. Civ. P. 60 (b). See 3 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 1331.
A- 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See 7 MooRE 60.37[3].
39 See, e.g., Griffith v. Bank of New York, 147 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1945); Laun v.
Kipp, 155 Wis. 347, 145 N.W. 183 (1914).
"s For example, in O'Boyle v. Bevil, 259 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1958), Judge Tuttle,
speaking for the Court of Appeals, stated: "Questions as to the setting aside of judg-
ments are difficult at best. This difficulty is increased when attack is made in a
federal court on a state court judgment. There is one principle, however, that stands
out clearly in this area of controversy. That is that in diversity cases, a federal court
may set aside a state court judgment for equitable grounds that are recognized by
the state as a basis for such action." Id. at 511-12.
"See Note, 54 YALE L.J. 687 nn.20 & 25 (1945), and authorities cited therein.
,2 147 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1945).
"Bank of New York v. Kaufman, 26 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. 1940), afl'd, 261 App
Div. 818, 25 N.Y.S.2d. 408 (1941).
"11147 F.2d at 904.
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The weight of authority and the better reasoning seem to support
the view that Erie requires the federal courts to grant or withhold
relief in accordance with state law to avoid the spectacle of different
results in the same state depending on whether the independent
action is brought in a state or federal court.45 This reasoning coin-
cides with the concept that the essential purpose of diversity juris-
diction in the federal courts is to provide another forum to determine
the rights of the parties-not to create another body of law.40
The real character of the action to establish fraud is more clearly
revealed by tracing the chain of consequences to its ultimate con-
clusion. The immediate purpose of the attacking action is to show
fraud; the essential purpose of showing fraud is not to avoid the
prior judgment, but rather to establish why an offense or defense
which would have changed the allocation of rights in the previous
action, was not then presented. Thus the showing of fraud does
nothing more than provide the justification for admitting additional
evidence after the conclusion of the prior proceeding.47 It may
properly be said that the admission of evidence is a matter of pro-
cedure; however, the rules of admission and exclusion which operate
to completely bar recovery in a suit brought in a state court bear
vitally and not formally or negligibly on the state's policy regarding
finality of local judgments. 48 The determination which must be
" See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); 7 MooRE 60.37[3] at 633-34.
10 "Diversity jurisdiction is founded on assurance to non-resident litigants of courts
free from susceptibility to potential local bias. The Framers of the Constitution,
according to Marshall, entertained 'apprehensions' lest distant suitors be subjected
to local bias in State courts, or, at least, viewed with 'indulgence the possible fears
and apprehensions' of such suitors .... And so Congress afforded out-of-State litigants
another tribunal, not another body of law." Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 826 U.S.
99, 111-12 (1945). Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525,
536-39 (1958).
'7 The mere showing of fraud does not entitle the complaining party to relief; it
only entities him to show that the previously adjudicated rights would have been
allocated differently but for the fraud. Without first showing fraud (or other similar
grounds for relief not considered herein) in the prior action, the complaining party
will not be permitted to demonstrate that the prior allocation of rights should be
changed by introducing additional evidence of injury, a valid defense. See note 72
infra.
""The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the
same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court
instead of in a State court a block away should not lead to a substantially different
result. . . . Plainly enough, a statute that would completely bar recovery in a suit
if brought in a State court bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely
formally or negligibly. As to consequences that so intimately affect recovery or non-
recovery a federal court in a diversity case should follow State law." Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109-10 (1945).
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made in the context here considered is whether state or federal law
shall prescribe the factors sufficient to disturb the finality of a state
court's judgment.
It is submitted that Erie requires the federal courts to apply state
law in a proceeding attacking a final state court judgment. When
a state establishes limits within which a person may avoid the effect
of a final decree of a state tribunal, absent contrary expression, relief
beyond the specified limits is precluded by negative implication. A
refusal by the federal courts to abide by these specified limits effec-
tively creates additional rights and remedies to those granted by the
state.49 Recognizing that such a result would be contrary to the
purpose of diversity jurisdiction," the Supreme Court has held that
the federal courts cannot grant relief to litigants when relief is
barred in the state courts by statutes of limitations,' contributory
negligence,0 2 failure to meet a burden of proof,0 3 and local applica-
tions of conflict of laws rules.54  Therefore, when a state creates a
right to recover and then limits that right, either directly by refusing
to allow an action to be brought after the lapse of a certain period of
time, or impliedly by requiring the existence of certain conditions"0
-for example the presence of extrinsic fraud-it seems clear that
federal courts in diversity cases should follow state law.
Moreover, the arguments advanced in favor of applying federal
law to independent actions seeking to set aside prior judgments for
fraud are cursory and appear to be superficial. One commentator,
for example, reasoned that the extrinsic-intrinsic dichotomy was
procedural because it was used as a device for effecting the distribu-
tion of the power of review of judgments among various courts.50
9 Where state law allows relief from final judgments only where extrinsic fraud
is present, dearly the federal courts will be creating a new basis for relief if they
permit the prior judgment to be set aside on a showing of intrinsic fraud only. On
the other hand, a refusal to abrogate the binding effect of a final judgment upon
a showing of intrinsic fraud when state law specifies that any fraud is sufficient to
avoid a prior judgment is similarly creating an additional right to the victorious
party in the prior action. This seems contrary to the Supreme Court's statement of
the purpose of diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. See note 46 supra.
" Ibid.
"' Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
52 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
' Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
"See note 49 supra.
Note, Relief in Federal Courts Against State Judgments Obtained by Fraud, 54
YALE L.J. 687, 693-94 (1945). This reasoning developed as a result of the writer's
attempt to justify the remark of Judge Clark in Griflith v. Bank of New York that
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His conclusion appears to be based on the assumptions that intrinsic
fraud excludes review by a different tribunal by limiting such an
attack within the framework of the original action and its ancillary
proceedings, and that extrinsic fraud excludes review by the same
tribunal because such an attack is an independent, rather than an
ancillary or supplementary, proceeding.5 7 To the contrary, some
states require that all direct attacks on prior judgments be brought
in the same court which rendered the judgment.5 8 The acknowledg-
ment that intrinsic fraud limits review to an ancillary or supple-
mentary proceeding is itself a recognition that intrinsic fraud will
not support an independent action for relief from a prior judgment.
The corollary to this acknowledgment obviously is that extrinsic
fraud will support the independent action. The writer's reasoning
appears to ignore this fundamental basis for the distinction-that
extrinsic fraud will support an independent action while intrinsic
fraud will not-and seems to assume that relief from a final judgment
for intrinsic fraud is denied because the distinction limits him to
courts which may properly hear ancillary or supplementary pro-
ceedings. It is submitted that it is the determination of the right to
relief which requires the application of state law and that the ascer-
tainment of a proper court to hear the action is merely a collateral
matter following the initial determination.
The same commentator asserted that as a result of Marshall v.
such attacks were not covered by the Erie doctrine because they were matters of pro-
cedure. 147 F.2d 899 at 904 (2d Cir. 1945).
7 "This view [that the necessary fraud for setting aside prior judgments is a
matter of procedure] gains support from the fact that the right to seek review of a
judgment generally depends on whether the injured party had the opportunity of
bringing before the court in the original action the facts and issues that constitute
fraud. If he had, the policy of avoiding relitigation would generally cause the review
to be limited by the framework of the original action and its ancillary proceedings,
excluding any action before a different tribunal; the latter would be appropriate only
when the fraud itself prevented the litigant from fairly presenting the facts in his
favor to the original court. Consequently, the classification of fraud resolves itself
into a determination of which court is the proper one for the case to be brought in,
and the dichotomy between 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' fraud becomes a device for
effecting a distribution of the power of review over judgments." Note, 54 YALE L.J.
687, 693 (1945).
" See, e.g., Duncan Coffee Co. v. Wilson, 139 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940),
where the court held that a direct attack on a final judgment rendered in a Texas
court could be brought only in the same court which rendered the judgment being
attacked; and an action otherwise qualifying as a direct attack, but brought in a
different court will be considered collateral rather than direct. For a general discus-
sion of the Texas rule see Hodges, Collateral Attacks on Judgments (pts. 1-2), 41
TExAs L. RFv. 163, 499 (1962-1963).
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Holmes59 the Supreme Court was committed to a rejection of the
extrinsic-intrinsic dichotomy.60 Consequently, an incongruous situ-
ation is presented from which the author provides no escape: The
extrinsic-intrinsic distinction is a matter of procedure under state
law because the distinction is used to allocate the power of review.
Since it is a procedural matter, federal law rather than state law is
applicable. Under federal law, however, the distinction is not used
to allocate the power of review, which is the only basis for defining it
as procedural, because federal law does not recognize the distinction.
Therefore, under federal law the assertion of fraud must be sub-
stantive, which requires the application of state law in diversity
cases.
CONCLUSION
A federal court may, in appropriate cases 1 where it has jurisdic-
tion as a result of diversity of citizenship, grant relief from a prior
final judgment of a state court. The better view, under the Erie
doctrine, is that in diversity cases where there is no federal question
involved,62 a federal court may grant relief if the proceeding had
been brought in the proper state court. This view is based on the
theory that the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts is merely
to provide another tribunal for the settlement of contested rights and
is not to create another body of law within a state. 3 Therefore, to
grant relief in a federal court when no similar relief is available
09 141 U.S. 589 (1891). See notes 16 & 17 supra and accompanying text.
6"Note, 54 YALE L.J. 687 n.20 (1945).
61 See discussion accompanying note 3 supra.
02 Closely related to the problem here under consideration is a question of federal
constitutional law which must be distinguished. The problem arises from the "due
process of law" requirement of the fourteenth amendment and is found in situations
where the judgment being attacked is void rather than voidable. Where, for example,
the prior court had no jurisdiction of the parties or the subject matter, the action
attacking that judgment may properly be brought in the federal courts without regard
to state law. In such situations, however, the proceeding has substantially changed
from a diversity case to a federal question case.
For a discussion of, and suggested solutions to, some of the problems raised by
applying the void-voidable distinction to direct and collateral attacks see Comment,
66 YALE L.J. 526 (1957). See Daniels v. Thomas, 225 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1955), where
the court of appeals stated: "It is a principle as old as our dual state and federal
judicial systems that a federal court is without jurisdiction to interfere with a judg.
ment in a state court action in which the state court had jurisdiction of the subject
matter and the parties thereto. It is only when the judgment of a state court is void
either because that court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties
to the action, or because it entered a judgment which it had no power to enter under
the law, that such judgment may be reviewed in a federal court." Id. at 797.
"3See note 46 supra.
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in the state courts would abrogate this rule and effectively create an
additional remedy rather than merely an additional tribunal.6
Diversity cases in federal courts attacking prior state court judg-
ments are limited, however, by virtue of the fact that the federal
courts have not been given a power of review over state court judg-
ments. 5 Consequently, any proceeding attacking a state court judg-
ment cannot be supplementary or ancillary but must be an inde-
pendent action. 0 The independent action attacking the validity
of a prior judgment is an equitable proceeding;67 therefore, a federal
court cannot act directly on the judgment by amending, annulling or
vacating it, but rather is limited to acting on the parties in accord-
ance with general equitable principles.68
The application of these general equitable principles has led the
courts to distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud.69 This
dichotomy recognizes the principles embodied in the doctrine of res
judicata7 by defining intrinsic fraud as fraud which was actually pre-
sented or necessarily considered in the prior action, and extrinsic
fraud as a collateral matter which was not previously in issue.71 After
finding the existence of the proper kind of fraud, a federal court will
otherwise grant relief only in accordance with other general prin-
ciples of equity.72
Despite the prevailing view that state law will govern in granting
relief from a prior state court judgment,73 the development of the
extrinsic-intrinsic dichotomy in the federal courts is significant be-
0, Cf. text accompanying note 49 supra.
0 For an excellent discussion of this matter pointing out that diversity jurisdiction
rests in the discretion of Congress to determine at what time and upon what condi-
tions the power may be invoked see Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 17-18 (1875).
00 See note 28 supra.
07 See notes 32 & 33 supra.
68 Ibid.
09 See note 7 supra.
70 
"The principle of res judicata 'that suits may not be immortal, while men are
mortal' is given primacy by Throckmorton over the principle of individual justice,
which, in theory at least, might be better achieved through the process of relitigation."
7 MooRE 60.37[l] at 609.
71 See note 7 supra and accompanying text.72 Thus, in addition to extrinsic fraud, the complaining party must show: that
the judgment rendered is inequitable, Kithcart v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 119 F.2d
497 (8th Cir. 1941), and Annot., 113 A.L.R. 1235 (1938), and authorities cited therein;
that a valid defense was available, Crim v. Handley, 94 U.S. 652 (1876); that he was
not at fault or negligent in failing to present his defense, Grubb v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930); and that the defense was not presented because of the
fraud of the other party, Sorenson v. Sutherland, 109 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1940).
7 See note 9 supra.
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cause it has been followed closely by the state courts. 4 Regard-
less of the state's acknowledged acceptance or rejection of the federal
extrinsic-intrinsic dichotomy, the results are likely to be similar
because of the application of general equitable principles, only a
part of which are embodied in the res judicata doctrine upon which
the extrinsic-intrinsic distinction is based.
7' 7 MooRs 60.37[1] & n.39.
